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Background: The reliance on out-of-pocket payments for health services leads to a catastrophic burden for many
households in Bangladesh. The World Health Organization suggests that risk-pooling mechanisms should be used
for financing healthcare. Like many low-income countries (LIC), a large share of employment in Bangladesh is in
the informal sector (88%). Inclusion of these workers in health insurance is a big challenge. Among other barriers,
the “literacy gap” for health insurance” is a reason for the low insurance uptake in Bangladesh. The aim of this
study is, therefore, to assess the impact of an educational intervention on willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health
insurance among informal sector workers in urban Bangladesh.
Method: An educational intervention on occupational solidarity and health insurance is offered to groups of informal
workers. Educational sessions take place once a week (3–4 hours) during three subsequent weeks for each occupational
group. For assessing the impact of the educational intervention, WTP for joining health insurance using occupational
solidarity between workers in “pre- and post-treatment” periods as well as between “control and treatment” groups were
compared. Multiple-regression analysis is applied for predicting WTP by educational intervention, while controlling for
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.
Results: The coefficient of variation (CoV) of the WTP is estimated in control and treatment groups and expected to
be lower in the latter. The WTP for health insurance is higher (33.8%) among workers who joined the educational
intervention in comparison with those who did not (control group). CoV of WTP is found to be generally lower in
post-treatment period and in treatment group compared to pre-treatment period and control group respectively.
Conclusion: Educational interventions can be used for increasing demand for health insurance scheme using
occupational solidarity among informal sector workers.
Keywords: Healthcare financing, Health insurance, Education, Willingness to pay, ImpactBackground
The poor in Bangladesh face many barriers to access
health care. Private health expenditure constitutes 64.3%
of total healthcare expenditure of which 97.4% is covered
through out of pocket payments (WHO, 2011). Reliance
on out-of-pocket payment for health services likely
leads to a catastrophic burden for many households in
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origmechanisms of healthcare financing, like health insurance,
is thus important for health-related financial protection
in the population, particularly for those in vulnerable
situations.
According to World Health Organization, risk-pooling
mechanisms should be used for financing healthcare to
achieve universal coverage n [3]. In health financing
policy, society risk-pooling mechanism appears to be igno-
red in policy prescriptions for many low income countries
[3,4]. The inclusion of poor and informal sector workers in
these mechanisms appears to be a challenge that has yet to
be addressed [5,6]. Community-based health insurance
has been recommended for informal sector workers foris is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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ered as a unit of solidarity in many social movements and
historically such solidarity has been a basis of health insur-
ance development [8]. According to Oxford Learner’s
dictionary, Solidarity (with somebody) means support by
one person or group of people for another because they
share feelings, opinions, aims, etc. In the current context,
the workers in same occupation (like, rickshaw-pullers) or
same sector (like, informal sector) are expected to share
common feelings for financial risk protection for health.
Of total employments in Bangladesh, 88% takes place in
informal sector, of which, 48% is in the non-agricultural
sector. The informal sector alone contributes to 63.6% of
total GDP and 75.3% of this comes from the non-
agricultural sector. This means that the agricultural sector
dominates in terms of the number of workers and non-
agricultural sector dominates in terms of income [9].
Considering the size of informal sector labor force and the
contribution to the economy and challenges of healthcare
financing, an effort to bring health insurance to informal
laborers should be initiated.
A literature review by the International Labor Orga-
nization and Micro Insurance Initiation facility identified
a number of barriers that restrict potential clients from
joining health insurance schemes in low- and middle-in-
come countries. Among the barriers, the “literacy gap”
or the lack of knowledge about insurance (mechanism,
utility etc.) was found to be important [10-12]. In
Bangladesh, studies on knowledge about health insu-
rance are not readily found; however, there are indi-
cations that a literacy gap for health insurance exists.
The prevalence of health insurance coverage among the
general population, either rich or poor, is very low. The
National Health Accounts of Bangladesh shows that only
0.10% of healthcare expenditure is borne by pre-
payments mechanism [13].
Micro Health Insurance (MHI) is an emerging sector
which is strongly linked to the microcredit movement in
Bangladesh [14]. Currently, health insurance is offered by
a number of micro-credit institutes like: Grameen, Kalyan
and Sajida Foundation. In these programs, the potential
clients purchase micro-health insurance if they borrow
from the institutions. It implies that this micro-health
insurance is not purchased by the clients on the basis of
demand. Other organizations, like Gono-swasthyo Kendro
(GK) offers health cards against which a benefit package is
available to the card purchasers. Such an arrangement
may reduce the financial risks of illness for the clients,
but may not be insufficient for generating revenue for
financing healthcare in a sustainable way. Organizations
which currently offer micro health insurance inform the
clients about the benefit package. Since these institutions
function as third-party insurers and solely have the
responsibility for management, informing clients aboutthe mechanism of health insurance (like, risk pooling) and
the importance of solidarity for combating healthcare
expenditure through health insurance (like, social and
community-based health insurance) may not be their
primary concern. Research from Kenya has shown that
the spirit of solidarity and the rationale for health insu-
rance are some of the key issues for demand for health
insurance in the informal sector [15]. While many health
awareness (educational) programs for disease prevention
and health promotion are available in Bangladesh, educa-
tion about protection against financial risk during illness
is not generally found. In such a condition, a comprehen-
sive education intervention on health insurance, its
mechanisms, utility and role of solidarity for informal
sector workers of Bangladesh can be useful. The aim of
this study is to assess the impact of an educational inter-
vention on willingness-to-pay for health insurance using
occupational solidarity among informal sector workers in
urban Bangladesh.
Methods
We have used a quasi experimental study design to assess
the impact of an educational intervention on the
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for joining health insurance.
Specifically, we employ occupational cooperatives between
workers in pre- and post-treatment periods as well as bet-
ween control and treatment groups have been compared.
Multiple regression analysis is applied for predicting WTP
for the intervention.
Population, sample and data
Informal workers, working or living in the areas around
any insurance provider (Gonoswyastho Kendro) or any
healthcare facility are considered to be the population of
this study. Three occupational groups (rickshaw-puller,
shop-keepers and restaurant workers) were selected as
study participants in three locations in Dhaka (metropolitan
city), Chandpur (district town) and Nobinagar/Savar
(sub-district). These occupational groups have been
selected for investigation considering that: i) the occu-
pations are generally found in all urban areas in
Bangladesh, ii) the practical situation such as the consent
of the occupational group representative and the working
environment allows for operating the educational inter-
vention and iii) a control group can be identified in a
practical context. The locations were selected from three
levels of administrative hierarchy of Bangladesh for a
national representation.
In the selected locations, we listed out the cooperatives
and potential participants by transect walk and informal
group discussion with the community members and
leaders. Detailed information about the cooperatives
(formal or informal) like location and address, representa-
tives of the cooperatives and their contact number were
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and cooperatives of the rickshaw-pullers in the selected
areas have been listed. A list of workers was provided by
the representatives/leaders of the cooperatives (formal or
informal). Considering the practical working environment
of occupational groups in the intervention sites, assistance
of occupational/community leaders was essential for
getting workers as participants in the study. A number of
inclusion and exclusion criteria were considered as well.
The inclusion criteria comprised age (18 years or above)
and experience (working in the same occupational at least
last one year). If the worker was exposed by any health
insurance or any health insurance education, he/she is
excluded from the study.
The treatment and control groups were separated by a
road or river so that the participants in the control group
cannot be exposed by intervention through the partici-
pants of the treatment group. It needs to be emphasized
here that during the listing procedure, we discussed with
the community leaders about possible dissimilarities
between the workers across the road or river and no
potential difference was reported. For keeping similarities
in socioeconomic characteristics between treatment and
control groups, we considered only market places to be
included in the sample from all occupational groups.
Consequently, we received two separate lists of potential
participants for control and treatment groups in each
location. We randomly selected the participants in control
and treatment groups from respective lists. In each area, it
took 2 months for completing data collection including
pre- and post-treatment periods. Post-treatment data was
collected one month after the educational intervention
has been completed for avoiding the immediate impact of
intervention on participants [16,17]. In control groups, we
collect data for one time. Data in all study areas has been
collected during 15th December 2010 – 15th April 2011.
Our interest was to estimate mean values of WTP from
three occupational groups in the three areas. The Central
Limit Theorem suggests that at least 30 cases are required
for calculating mean value with an assumption of normal
distribution [18]. This implies that 30 workers in each of
three occupations in three areas constitute 270 samples in
each of control and treatment group, which means that at
least a total of 540 samples are required for the study.
We invited all the participants (282) in the pre-
treatment group to attend a three-day educational inter-
vention. 25 of them were unable to attend the intervention
program due to personal reasons. We also lost some
participants (32) during the time of the educational inter-
vention. The participants (8 in Dhaka, 9 in Chandpur and
15 in Nobinagar/Savar) who missed one or more days in
three study areas were excluded as not properly exposed
by the intervention. These participants (total 32 or 12.5%)
are omitted from both pre- and post-treatment group inthe analyses. However, in the control group, we have
100% response rate.
Educational intervention procedure
Educational interventions on occupational solidarity and
health insurance were offered. Educational sessions take
place once a week (3–4 hours) during three subsequent
weeks for each occupational group. The interventions
used power point presentation (mostly pictorial), group
session and general discussion. In the first day, it contains
discussion about health condition, healthcare expenditure
and current healthcare facilities of workers. In the second
day, health insurance mechanisms and utility of health
insurance have been discussed. Potential uses of occupa-
tional solidarity for developing health insurance scheme
have been discussed in the third day. In the (Table 1), the
intervention procedure is presented.
Impact assessment
The impact of the educational intervention is assessed as
the change (between pre- and post-treatment) and
difference (between treatment and control) in the WTP
measurement. Further, multiple regression analysis is
applied for predicting WTP by educational intervention.
WTP data has been collected in pre-treatment period for
both control and treatment groups and also in post-
treatment period in treatment group. WTP are captured
using pre-fixed survey questionnaire.
Health insurance is a rare way of financing health
scheme in Bangladesh. The latest Bangladesh National
Health Accounts mentioned that only 0.1% of healthcare
financing is connected to health insurance [13]. Further,
the findings from informal discussion with the workers in
control and treatment group show that none of them were
exposed to any insurance education earlier. Our follow up
with the workers in control group shows that they were
not exposed to health insurance education or any infor-
mation in this regard from any other sources during the
study period. We, therefore, compared the post-treatment
group with the control group once.
Willingness to pay
Using Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), WTP for
health insurance is measured. This method has been
earlier used in many studies [19-21].
CVM questions can be either open-ended or discrete
[22]. In an open-ended valuation the respondents are
asked to state their maximum WTP for the benefit and
the technique most used is the so called “bidding game”.
A bidding game resembles an auction, where a first bid is
made to the respondent who either accepts or rejects.
Depending on the answer, the bid is then lowered or in-
creased until the respondent’s maximum WTP is reached.
This bidding game approach is applied in the study for
Table 1 Components of educational intervention
Day Topic Aim How Lead by
First Importance of urban informal sector
workers in Bangladesh
To make the participants understand the
potential of contribution to economy





Case study on Golam Kibria, an informal
sector worker who got sick and its
consequence on health, economy and family
To make understand the importance of
good health on economy and family
Group discussion Group moderator
Current healthcare facilities of workers
and its quality of service
To understand the current situation of
healthcare access and quality of care for
the workers under intervention and their
level of satisfaction
Group discussion Group moderator
Second Current mechanism of healthcare financing,
healthcare triangle, concept and utility of
health insurance





Insurance game To make understand the risk-sharing
mechanism
Game Group moderator
Roll-play To distinguish the service and payment
difference between non-insured and
insured patients
Short drama Jointly by educators
Types of health insurance and its merits
and demerits
To make understand the merits and
demerits of different types of insurance
(private for profit, NGO and community
based)
Discussion Group moderator
Third History of social health insurance and
recent development in low and middle
income countries
To put the participants into global







To understand the possibilities and
challenges of using occupational
cooperative/ solidarity for developing
health insurance
Group discussion Group moderator
Open discussion (questions and answers) To understand if the sessions could
successfully meet the goals and to clarify
any issues to the workers
Discussion Main facilitators and
all moderators
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years, “bidding game” has been employed in several stu-
dies for estimating WTP for health insurance in low- and
middle income countries [20,23]. However, bidding game
may be accompanied with estimation bias, which is a form
of framing effect where the respondents’ answers are
influenced by the first numbers presented in the bidding
game [24]. On the contrary, there are studies which used
bidding game, but observed no starting point bias [25,26].
For capturing the starting bids, we interviewed a num-
ber of workers from each occupational group. We found a
range between 10 and 30 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) which
were put randomly in the questionnaire as the starting
bids. The interviewer described the benefit package to the
respondent and asked if he/she is willing to pay the
amount that has been randomly placed as starting bid for
the respective respondent. If the respondent agreed to pay
the amount, then the interviewer raised the bid with
higher amount. The interviewer continues until the
respondent disagrees to pay higher amount. On the
contrary, if the respondent disagrees to pay the amount of
starting bid the interviewer lowered the amount and askedagain about the willingness to pay of the respondent. This
process continues until the respondent agreed to pay an
amount including no payment. The benefit package,
which is as same as that offered by Gonoshasthaya Kendra
against a pre-paid membership card, was tested for
investigating the WTP of workers for obtaining that pack-
age through a hypothetical health insurance. The product
is described in the (Table 2).
Finally, in the descriptive statistics, the knowledge level
and attitude are captured by observing the frequency of
response category to each corresponding question. The
frequencies are then compared between “pre- and post-
treatment” and “treatment and control” groups. Mean and
coefficient-of-variation (CoV) of WTP for an insurance
package are observed between the comparison groups. We
expect WTP improve and CoV lower among workers who
attend the educational intervention. The Cohen’s d, effect-
size (ES) measurement is used for representing changes
between pre-treatment and post-treatment and between
control and post-treatment. Cohen (1965) showed that one
useful option for measuring the effect size between
dummy-coded groups or conditions (e.g., coded 1 for
Table 2 The service package of a real health insurance
product
Eligibility Anyone on paying premium
Group or individual Family up to 4 members
Period of services One year
Outpatient Low income/poor
Medical officer visit Free of cost
Specialist visit 60 BDT
Inpatient




Most of the tests Free of cost
Some tests 10 - 200 BDT
Blood transfusion of neonatal 500 BDT
Other treatment of neonatal Free of cost
Normal delivery 100 - 500 BDT
Caesarean and other surgery 2000 - 3000 BDT
Orthopedic surgery 3000 - 4000 BDT
Appendicitis 100 BDT
Gall bladder operation 3000 BDT
Medicine 50% discount of MRP set by government
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variable. The Cohen’s d, effect-size concentrate on the
standardized difference between the sample means (M1
and M2) [27,28]. Cohen’s d is defined as,
d ¼ M1−M2
δPooled
Where, δPooled is a pooled estimate of the population
standard deviation. The ES is regarded as large when
d = 0.5 and above, moderate when d = 0.2 to 0.5 and small
when d= 0.2 and below [27,28].
Econometric model
In the regression model, we predict natural logged WTP
by participation in intervention (main variable of interest)
while controlling for demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics. Insurance literature demonstrates that
demand for health insurance is influenced not only by
knowledge but also by other factors. Folland et al. (2007),
in a theoretical model mentioned that premium, income
or wealth, health status and risk of losing income are
factors that can affect the demand for health insurance
[29]. Similar factors have been indicated by researchers
from their empirical investigations [30-33]. While
assessing the impact of educational intervention, theseother factors should be controlled. In the regression
model, we therefore control for a range of variables,
namely, demographic characteristics, institutional educa-
tion level, and household income, experience of illness
among household members, occupation and place of
residence. The model below is tested in the analysis.
y ¼ αþ β1x1 þ β2x2 þ…………þ βnxn þ ε
Where, y denotes natural logged WTP for joining an
insurance scheme, α is a constant, x1 indicates if the
worker went through educational intervention with values
0 or 1 (0 = did not have educational intervention/control,
1 = had educational intervention/treatment), β1 is the
coefficient that shows the magnitude and direction of
relationship with y. x2 … …xn denote the control variables.
β2… …βn denote adjacent coefficients to the correspon-
ding variables and ε means error term. The model is
tested for sensitivity by including and excluding any vari-
ables and by estimating the robust standard error. A series
of diagnostic tests, like presence of heteroscedasticity,
multicollinearity, omitted variables are carried out.
Results
A description of characteristics of control and treatment
groups is presented, followed by the impact assessment
results. Impact assessment is described by presenting the
WTP for insurance in treatment and control groups and
the outcomes of econometric analyses.
Characteristics of control and treatment groups
Demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status
and household size), institutional education level, economic
condition (household income), health status (illness) and
health expenditure are observed in control and treatment
groups. The characteristics are presented in the (Table 3).
Independent sample t-test of mean and proportion differ-
ence has been carried out for observing if there is any
significant difference between control and treatment
groups. Mean age of all workers in control group is
30.3 years and in treatment group is 30.8 years. No signifi-
cant difference (p-value = 0.606) was observed between
these two groups. Other characteristics also showed
similarities between these two groups.
Impact assessment
Quantitative analyses include both descriptive statistics
and statistical inference tests. Changes (pre- and post-
treatment) and differences (control and treatment) in
WTP for participating in such schemes are shown.
Further, an output of econometric analysis where WTP
(natural logged) has been predicted by participation in
educational intervention (treatment) is presented.
Table 3 Characteristics of sample in control and treatment groups
Variables Measurement Rickshaw-puller Shop-keeper Restaurant worker Total
Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
Age Mean (SDa)) in years 32.1 (9.8) 34.65 (10.0) 26.9 (9.5) 28.0 (8.29) 32.0 (11.5) 30.2 (10.3) 30.3 (10.5) 30.78 (9.9)
Sig. of mean difference 0.112 0.397 0.299 0.606
Gender Male (%) 100% 100% 96.8% 100% 90.8% 81.94% 95.9% 94.1%
Sig. of proportion diff. - 0.102 0.101 0.347
Marital status Married (%) 85.9% 79.4% 39.4% 34.1% 71.3% 58.3% 65.2% 55.9%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.281 0.475 0.088 0.034
Household size Mean (SD) 3.1 (0.98) 3.4 (1.0) 4.1 (1.85) 3.7 (1.35) 3.4 (1.4) 3.6 (1.5) 3.5 (1.5) 3.6 (1.3)
Sig. of mean difference 0.299 0.239 0.477 0.849
Institutional educational level Less than one year (%) 75.0% 66.1% 11.7% 9.8% 48.3% 38.9% 44.7% 36.5%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.222 0.678 0.235 0.065
Up to primary level (%) 17.4% 30.9% 37.2% 28.0% 36.8% 34.7% 30.4% 31.0%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.045 0.196 0.788 0.871
More than primary level 7.6% 2.9% 51.0% 62.2% 14.9% 26.4% 24.9% 32.4%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.205 0.138 0.073 0.065
Household income per equivalent adultb) Mean (SD) in BDTc) 3151 (1376) 3129 (1436) 3360 (1562) 3735 (1740) 2447 (1112) 2975 (1754) 3024 (1419) 3308 (1675)
Sig. of mean difference 0.94 0.227 0.084 0.103
Health expenditure in last 6 months Mean (SD) in BDT 1314 (49) 1814 (4944) 1838 (3893) 2176 (3893) 2066 (7059) 2041 (7344) 1734 (5399) 2021 (6159)
Sig. of mean difference 0.527 0.655 0.983 0.581
Illness in household Yes (%) 89.1% 86.8% 82.9% 85.4% 89.7% 87.5% 87.2% 86.5%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.648 0.666 0.669 0.820
Location Metropolitan city (%) 32.6% 36.8% 34.0% 34.1% 33.3% 36.1% 33.3% 35.6%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.584 0.988 0.714 0.600
District (%) 34.8% 29.4% 34.0% 34.1% 35.6% 27.8% 34.8% 30.6%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.473 0.988 0.291 0.326
Sub-district (%) 32.6% 33.8% 31.9% 31.7% 31.0% 36.1% 31.9% 33.8%
Sig. of proportion diff. 0.872 0.977 0.499 0.651
Observations 92 68 94 82 87 72 273 222
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Between pre- and post-treatment periods, mean WTP has
increased in workers after intervention in all occupational
groups. Paired t-test between pre- and post-treatment
showed that the changes in average WTP were statistically
significant (1% risk-level) in shop-keepers and boarder line
significant in rickshaw-pullers (10% risk-level) (Table 4).
CoVs showed that in post-treatment period, variations
had been reduced in workers of all occupations in treat-
ment group. The Cohen’s d ES showed moderate
effect for all workers (d=−0.317). Similar ES observed
for Rickshaw-pullers d=−0.281; Shop-keepers d=−0.501.
Small ES was observed for Restaurant workers
d=−0.-0.186).
Comparison between control and treatment group
showed that WTP was significantly higher in treatment
group in all occupations at 1% risk level. However, Inde-
pendent sample t-test showed significant (10% risk-level)
difference in mean WTP of rickshaw-pullers (Table 5).
CoVs were lower in treatment groups in all occupations
compared with control groups. Moderate effect was found
for all workers as well as for each occupational group.
Econometric analysis
Regression analysis (Table 6) shows that those who had
gone through the educational intervention (treatment
group) were willing to pay significantly more (33.8%) than
workers in control group. Due to missing data in some
control variables, number of observations reduced in the
estimation. Using hadimvo test, 5 extreme outliers have
been eliminated from the analysis. The significant differ-
ence between treatment and control group remain same
even when the outliers were included. Workers who had
up to primary level education are willing to pay less than
those who had less than one year education. However,
workers who had higher education than primary level are
likely to pay more than reference group, but not
significantly. A significant difference in WTP among occu-
pational groups was observed. Restaurant workers and
shop-keepers were willing to pay significantly less thanTable 4 Change in willingness-to-pay (mean and CoV) betwee
effect sizes (Cohen’s d)





Restaurant workers Pre 17.4
Post 19.8
All workers Pre 18.2
Post 22.3rickshaw-pullers. No significant variation across geo-
graphic areas was found.
The regression model explains 15.6% of total variations
(R2 = 0.156). The diagnostic tests favor the regression
model. The Breusch–Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test showed
that heteroscedasticity was not present in the model. Vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) test with its maximum value of
2.68 indicates that there is no multicollinearity in the
regression model. Ramsey RESET test showed that there
was sufficient evidence against the hypothesis of omitted
variable bias in the model.
For testing the robustness of the relationship between
educational intervention and magnitude of WTP (natural
logged), robust standard error has been calculated. The
regression model has been reduced and extended by
excluding and including variables. All models have shown
that the workers in treatment group were willing to pay
more for the health insurance that has been tested.
Discussion
Among the workers in the treatment group, WTP
increased between pre- and post-treatment periods. Both of
these indicators were also higher in treatment groups in
comparison to the control group. The WTP for participa-
ting in health insurance was 33.8% higher among workers
who joined the educational intervention in comparison
with who did not (control group). CoV of WTP was found
to be generally lower in post-treatment period than in pre-
treatment period. It was also lower in treatment group than
in control group. Increase in WTP is significant, but low
which reflects increase in the demand for insurance in a
low-income community to some extent. However, the esti-
mated effect size of this education intervention was found
to be moderate in all occupational groups. In addition,
lower CoV in treatment group means that the workers with
educational intervention became more cohesive in their
response to WTP, which can be considered as a positive
outcome of the intervention program.
The workers who underwent the educational interven-
tion are willing to pay on an average 5.48 BDT per weekn pre- and post-treatment periods and within group









Table 5 Difference in willingness-to-pay (mean and CoV) in control and treatment groups and within group effect sizes
(Cohen’s d)
Occupational group Measurement Mean Sig. of mean difference (p-value) ES (Cohen’s d) Coefficient of variation
Rickshaw-puller Control 23.0 0.067 −0.293 69.2
Treatment 27.2 45.2
Shop-keeper Control 12.5 0.000 −0.606 112.9
Treatment 20.3 57.1
Restaurant workers Control 13.1 0.001 −0.537 96.3
Treatment 19.8 62.8
All workers Control 16.2 0.000 −0.433 92.8
Treatment 22.3 56.1
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intervention. It means that an additional 285 BDT
(3.8 US$) can be accumulated per year from each
worker. As an absolute amount, the mean WTP of a
worker with educational intervention was estimated to
be 21.7 BDT (0.30 US$) per week per household or 86.8
BDT (1.16 US$) per month, which was 16.2 BDT
(0.22 US$) for workers in control group. In a one year
period each worker with education on health insurance
was willing to pay 1,128 BDT (15.2 US$). There are 41.5Table 6 Estimated effect of treatment (educational interventi
participating in health insurance
Variables Description
Treatment Yes (ref = control)
Age In years
Gender Female (Ref = male)
Marital status Unmarried (ref = marr
Others (ref = married)
Household size Number of household
Institutional educational level Up to primary level (re
More than primary lev
Household incomea) Logged income per m
Illness in last 6 months Illness of respondent o
Location Sub-district (ref= Metr
District (ref= Metropol








Ramsey RESET, F (p>F)
Note: ***, ** and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% risk level respectively, a)million workers with informal employment (both urban
and rural) in Bangladesh of which 20 million are in
urban areas [9]. If all these workers can be brought into
health insurance by educating them and the estimated
WTP (premium) can be applied, a total sum of 22,568
million BDT (305 million US$) would be accumulated
for financing their healthcare. The total health expen-
diture in Bangladesh is 191,486 million BDT (2,660
million US$). The estimated total amount of fund (320








f = less than one year) −0.198 (0.083)**
el (ref = less than one year) 0.056 (0.096)
onth 0.034 (0.043)
r any household member 0.003 (0.099)
opolitan city) 0.119 (0.078)
itan city) −0.122 (0.078)
shaw-puller) −0.387 (0.097)***








Per equivalent adult (natural logged).
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diture of Bangladesh.
WTP for health insurance varies across countries. A
study in Ghana shows that almost 64% of respondents
were willing to pay about Cedi 5000 or 3.00 US$ per
month for a household of five members for a National
Health Insurance scheme aimed at the informal sector
[19]. Asgary et al. (2004) examined WTP for health
insurance in rural Iran finding that households are will-
ing to pay on average 2.77 US$ per month for health
insurance [34]. On average, an uninsured individual in
the Greater Windhoek Area of Namibia is willing to pay
47.50 NAD or 6.60 US$ per capita per month [23]. A
study in India showed that the median WTP was 600
INR per year (13.04 US$) per household or 1.09 US$ per
month [20]. The studies above generally considered
formal institutional education as an explanatory variable
of WTP. But no educational intervention directed to
“health insurance and usage of occupational solidarity”
has been considered in earlier studies. It may not be
surprising that a specific education on health insurance
have higher impact than a formal education as found in
our current study. We observed that the rickshaw-pullers
are willing to pay more than other occupational groups. It
may be explained by their daily cash-flow as income, while
the other groups normally have a monthly-salary.
Our study has assessed the impact of health-insurance
related educational intervention in terms of change/dif-
ference in WTP, while other studies simply did WTP for
health insurance [19,20,23,34]. Since this current study
mainly has assessed the impact of educational inter-
vention in terms of change in WTP, it is not directly
comparable to any earlier studies. Our literature review
suggests that studies of such impact assessment are not
found.
For impact assessment of education intervention quasi
experimental study design is used. Quasi-experimental
design is an empirical study which typically allows the
researcher to control the assignment to the treatment
condition, but using some criterion other than random
assignment [35]. The major weakness of the quasi-
experimental study design is the lack of random assign-
ment. It requires multiple comparisons (between groups,
within groups, effect sizes) while interpreting the results
[36]. Due to non-randomness there is possibility of
confounding bias in quasi-experimental which is often
used to discount this study results. However, such bias
can be controlled for using various statistical techniques
such as multiple regression analysis [37]. Although the
experimental design offer the greatest strength of
evidence, quasi-experimental designs are often more
feasible in natural social settings [35,38]. Utilizing quasi-
experimental designs minimizes the threats to external
validity as natural environments do not suffer the sameproblems of artificiality as compared to a well-controlled
laboratory setting [38].
It can be argued that the control group might be
contaminated by treatment group through discussing
the intervention with each other. We, therefore, sepa-
rated them by selecting from different geographic
locations. Since shop-keepers and restaurant workers
work in static physical facilities, they have low chance to
be contaminated. Rickshaw-pullers in treatment and
control groups were selected from garages (from where
they hire rickshaw) located in different places. They may
have small chance to meet each other in the street. Since
they are mostly busy with their works during working
hours, the risk of such contamination is low.
For encouraging workers to adopt health insurance,
knowledge about health insurance is required. Workers
need to understand that the health insurance is a way of
financing healthcare through which healthcare can be
availed at an affordable price whenever required. It
reduces the catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure
[39]. In a comprehensive educational module, a series of
issues needs to be included. The target population should
discuss their present need for healthcare and the ways of
meeting healthcare expenses. The mechanisms (like, risk-
pooling) of health insurance, the involvement and role of
different actors in an insurance scheme (like, healthcare
providers, insurance providers) and the nature of the
prospective clients as well as the utility of insurance
should be discussed in educational sessions. It is impor-
tant to make clear distinguish between “knowledge about
health insurance” and “marketing of a health insurance
product” while educating the workers. Other relevant
issues like trust to the insurance providers, benefit pack-
age, copayment/deductable should be discussed to a
greater extent. It is also observed during educational
sessions that most of disputation could be resolved
through open discussion among workers. For more tech-
nical issues opinion of moderators of the sessions were
useful. The workers in most of the cases could come into
consensus.
Conclusion
Educational intervention can be used for increasing
demand for health insurance scheme using occupational
solidarity among informal sector workers. Importantly,
educational modules should be comprehensive covering
need of healthcare in the community, existing accessibi-
lity to and quality of healthcare, risk-pooling mechanism,
types of health insurance, strength of occupational
solidarity, organization of health insurance using occu-
pational cooperatives etc. The response to any query
(does not matter how important the issue is) from the
participating workers must be replied logically and
convincingly during intervention sessions.
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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/3/1/12Healthcare financing is an essential component of
universal health coverage. In low- and middle income
countries funding healthcare for informal sector workers
has appeared to be a challenge. Indirect taxes have emer-
ged as a source of funding healthcare for these workers.
The informal sector workers are not in the income-tax
base though having income. Alternative funding sources
are thus required. The government of Bangladesh and
other low- and middle income countries can consider
health insurance using occupational solidarity as a poten-
tial complementary source of funding along with indirect
taxes for financing healthcare of informal sector workers.
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